Phase-noise limitations in continuous-variable quantum key distribution with homodyne detection by Corvaja, Roberto
PHYSICAL REVIEW A 95, 022315 (2017)
Phase-noise limitations in continuous-variable quantum key distribution with homodyne detection
Roberto Corvaja*
Department of Information Engineering, University of Padova, Via G. Gradenigo 6/B, 35131, Padova, Italy
(Received 16 May 2016; revised manuscript received 1 December 2016; published 9 February 2017)
In continuous-variables quantum key distribution with coherent states, the advantage of performing the
detection by using standard telecoms components is counterbalanced by the lack of a stable phase reference
in homodyne detection due to the complexity of optical phase-locking circuits and to the unavoidable phase noise
of lasers, which introduces a degradation on the achievable secure key rate. Pilot-assisted phase-noise estimation
and postdetection compensation techniques are used to implement a protocol with coherent states where a local
laser is employed and it is not locked to the received signal, but a postdetection phase correction is applied. Here
the reduction of the secure key rate determined by the laser phase noise, for both individual and collective attacks,
is analytically evaluated and a scheme of pilot-assisted phase estimation proposed, outlining the tradeoff in the
system design between phase noise and spectral efficiency. The optimal modulation variance as a function of the
phase-noise amount is derived.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.95.022315
I. INTRODUCTION
In quantum key distribution (QKD) a current trend towards
the deployment of continuous variables (CV) is driven mainly
by the advantage of using standard components for optical
fiber communications [1]. Moreover higher rates are expected
by the use of CV [2] and the efficiency of the measurement
is higher than in single-photon schemes. CV protocols have
been developed for nonclassical states-of-light-like squeezed
states [3], but also coherent states can be employed [4,5],
which are produced more easily and, unlike squeezed states,
propagate through the fiber channel without loosing their main
characteristics. Reverse reconciliation is more suited to CV-
QKD [4–6] and a proof of the composable security for CV-
QKD with coherent states is given in [7].
However, a major problem, common to all the coherent
detection schemes where the incoming signal phase carries
some data information, is the phase-locking between the local
laser carrier and the transmit laser. In almost all the studies
and experimental works, the same laser used at the trans-
mitter is employed also at the demodulation side [4,5,8]:
an unmodulated signal is sent through a parallel channel,
for example, on a different polarization or by time-division
multiplexing. This is a great limitation since it requires a high
power signal at the transmitter to get a sufficiently strong
signal at the receiver, for the combination and the subsequent
homodyne detection. Another side effect is the reduction of the
useful capacity to transmit also the reference carrier, namely
the spectral efficiency is reduced by the transmission of the
reference signal.
Recent self-referenced experiments [2,9,10] show the
feasibility of a scheme where the local oscillator is actually
generated “locally” at the receiver by an independent laser
and it is not phase-locked by complex optical phase-locked
loops. Instead, a postdetection phase correction is applied to
the photodiodes outputs. This is implemented by transmitting
pilot-symbols interlaced in time-division with the useful data
symbols. The pilots are used to retrieve a common phase
reference.
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Here the scheme of [9,10] is modified to reduce the number
of pilot symbols, thus increasing the spectral efficiency, and
the effect of phase noise is considered on the secure rate
of CV-QKD with homodyne detection employing hybrid
balanced detectors [11] and postdetection phase correction.
The secure rate is considered for both individual and collective
attacks based on the secure rate analysis of [7,9]. With respect
to [9,10], here the analytical expression of the phase-noise
degradation is provided and it is related to a practical system
parameter such as the laser bandwidth. Moreover the design
of a more spectral efficient pilot-data structure is proposed and
practical system design criteria provided.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A CV-QKD system is considered, where Alice modulates
the amplitude and phase of a laser, producing a coherent state
|xA + jyA〉 every symbol period T , where the in-phase xA and
quadrature yA components are Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and variance VA (expressed in shot-noise units). The
quantum state is applied to a fiber and Bob at the receiving
side performs homodyne detection obtaining the components
xB and yB .
The channel introduces additive noise and is characterized
in terms of the relations
xout =
√
G(xin + ex), (1)
yout =
√
G(yin + ey), (2)
where G is the channel gain (G < 1) and ex , ey represent the
line noises with variance χl , related to the losses and to the
excess noise .
Then a reverse reconciliation protocol is implemented: Bob
randomly chooses either component in-phase x or quadrature
y and sends back to Alice through an authenticated channel
a part of the bits corresponding to the quantization of x or
y. This step is followed by classical data processing for the
privacy amplification [1] to share a secure key between Alice
and Bob.
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FIG. 1. Homodyne receiver with 90◦ optical hybrid and balanced
detectors: The dots in the optical hybrid denote beam-splitters.
III. HOMODYNE DETECTION
The homodyne receiver is depicted in Fig. 1: It is composed
by a passive 90◦ optical hybrid, which combines the local laser
signal with the received optical signal, both in phase or after a
phase shift of 90◦, by using beam-splitters, which are denoted
by dots in the optical hybrid scheme of Fig. 1. The outputs are
then sent to a balanced photodetector, as in classical coherent
homodyne receivers [11].
The optical 90◦ hybrid combines the local oscillator
ELO =
√
PLO cos (ωLOt + θLO(t)), (3)
and the modulated signal corresponding to the coherent state
prepared by Alice received from the channel |xout + jyout〉 =
|√Psejφs 〉
Es =
√
Ps cos (ωst + φs + θs(t)). (4)
In (3) and (4) the terms θs(t) and θLO(t) represent the laser
phase noises at the transmitter and receiver, respectively. The
four hybrid outputs are sent to two balanced photodetectors,
giving the photocurrents
Ix = R
√
PLOPsη cos(φs + θs(t) − θLO(t)), (5)
Iy = R
√
PLOPsη sin(φs + θs(t) − θLO(t)), (6)
where R is the equivalent resistance. In typical applications the
power of the local oscillator is much larger than the received
signal PLO  Ps , so that the shot-noise is dominated by the
local oscillator.
We note that with respect to the state prepared by Alice,
Bob observes a coherent state |xB + jyB〉 which is degraded
by the channel noise and by the phase noise which introduces
the rotation ejφ with φ = θs(T ) − θLO(T ).
A postdetection phase correction scheme can be applied
by rotating the detected value by the angle (−φ), using
a pilot assisted channel equalization, as common in radio
communications [12] and proposed recently in [10] also for
optical fiber CV-QKD. The protocol for phase estimation
and correction proposed in [10] is that Alice transmits the
nonmodulated carrier with power Ps , which is considered
the pilot symbol, for each data symbol. This is used to estimate
the phase differenceφ between the local laser and the incoming
signal. The solution proposed in this work is modified with
φ1
pilot
data
φˆk
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φ2
pilot
FIG. 2. Pilot-assisted phase estimation and compensation: The
high-power received signal during pilot slots is used to estimate φ1
and φ2, which are used for the phase compensation by ˆφk during the
kth symbol.
respect to [10], in that a pilot symbol is transmitted for several
payload symbols Ns , as shown in Fig. 2, thus increasing the
spectral efficiency (the ratio between the useful symbols and
the total transmitted symbols) from 1/2 to Ns/(Ns + 1) and
correspondingly the energy efficiency from Ps/(Ps + Pp) to
NsPs/(NsPs + Pp). This scheme has the advantage of en-
abling homodyne detection without transmitting the reference
carrier together with the information coherent states, while
a really “local” laser is employed, with the sufficient power
required to perform the demodulation, not affected by the fiber
losses. Moreover, the postdetection phase correction removes
the need of locking between the local laser and the incoming
signal by complex devices, such as optical phase locked loops.
The main advantage with respect to [10] is the fact that a phase
reference pilot is shared among several payload symbols, thus
increasing the spectral efficiency.
Two successive pilot symbols can be employed to enhance
the accuracy of the phase reference estimation: the values φ1
and φ2 are obtained by by φi = arctan(yi/xi), i = 1,2. Then a
linear combination of the estimates is applied in the correction,
to compensate the phase error during the kth symbol by ˆφk .
Considering that, due to the Wiener model for the phase noise,
the variance of the phase noise increases with time, the best
linear combination of the estimations φ1 and φ2, in terms of
minimum estimation variance, is given by
ˆφk = Ns + 1 − k
Ns + 1 φ1 +
k
Ns + 1φ2 k = 1, . . . ,Ns. (7)
After the phase compensation, the residual phase error on the
equalized values corresponds to the phase-noise evolution of
both the local laser and the signal laser between the estimation
points and the compensation point. Thus, the kth variable used
by Bob for the QKD protocol is still rotated by the residual
phase-noise error
k = ˆφk − θLO(kT ) + θs(kT ). (8)
This reflects on the in-phase and quadrature components
measured by Bob as a multiplicative factor, namely cos k
on the kth in-phase value xB and sin k on the quadrature yB .
022315-2
PHASE-NOISE LIMITATIONS IN CONTINUOUS- . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW A 95, 022315 (2017)
Effect of phase noise on the variance of detected variables
The phase noise of lasers is suitably modeled by a Wiener
process so that the corresponding power spectral density of
the baseband equivalent of the noisy carrier is described by a
Lorentzian line
Pθ (f ) = 1
πB
1
1 + ( f
B
)2 , (9)
with 3-dB carrier bandwidth B. The amount of phase noise of
lasers is usually expressed by the bandwidth B, normalized
to the symbol period BT = B T . The characteristic of the
Wiener process is to have independent increments over disjoint
time intervals, so that the variance of the phase noise over the
symbol period T is given by
σ 2θ = 2πBT . (10)
In the following the normalized bandwidth BT is the parameter
used to quantify the amount of phase noise. The effect on the
detected sample is represented by the multiplicative factor
cos2 k (or sin2 k) at the output. We have
E[cos2(k)] = 12 + 12e−2σ
2
k, (11)
where E[·] denotes the expectation and σ 2k is the variance of
the residual phase noisek . Note that (11) can derived from the
characteristic function of a Gaussian random variable. Then,
according to (7) and (10), for independent phase noises θLO(t)
and θs(t), the variance of k is
σ 2k = E
[
2k
] = 4πBT
[
k
(
Ns + 1 − k
Ns + 1
)2
+
(
k
Ns + 1
)2
(Ns − k + 1)
]
. (12)
Note that the reference values φ1 and φ2 estimated on the
pilots are affected in principle by en error. However, as shown
in [10], the estimation error limited by the shot-noise becomes
negligible as soon as the number of photons associated to the
pilot symbols is greater than 100.
IV. SECURE KEY RATE
Reverse reconciliation [6] is considered, where Bob reveals
a fraction of the bits to Alice. Eve needs to guess the
measurements of Bob without introducing too much noise or
degradation. Several attacks could be considered and in general
it is assumed the entangling-cloner model for Eve, in which the
best estimates of Eve are only limited by Heisenberg relations
[4]. A proof of the composable security against collective
attacks for CV-QKD with coherent states has been proposed
in [7].
A. Security against individual attacks
According to the proofs of [4,13] the raw secret key rate is
given by
R0 = IAB − IBE. (13)
Taking into account the efficiency of the reconciliation
protocol and of the pilot symbols, the practical net secret key
rate is given by
R = Ns
Ns + 1[βIAB − IBE], (14)
whereβ represents the efficiency of the reconciliation protocol,
with typical values that can reach 87% [5], by the use of LPDC
codes.
As outlined in [5], Alice-Bob mutual information is given
by
IAB = 12 log2
(
1 + VA
1 + χt
)
, (15)
where χt is the total noise variance referred to the input
χt = χl + χd
G
, (16)
which includes the “line” noise χl , including the excess
noise 
χl = 1 − G
G
+ , (17)
and the detection noise variance χd , which is due to: photode-
tector efficiency η, electronic noise variance νel, and the phase
noise contribution χθ ,
χd = 1 − η
η
+ νel + VAχθ
η
. (18)
From the analysis in the previous section, the phase-noise
contribution (referred to the input) is
χθ = 12
(
1 − e−2σ 2). (19)
On the other hand, Eve’s information IBE is [5]
IBE = 12 log2
[
G2
(1 + χt + VA)
(
χl + 11+VA
)
1 + Gχd
(
χl + 11+VA
)
]
. (20)
B. Security against collective attacks
In the case of collective attacks an analysis of the conditions
for the composable security and an upper bound on the the
secure rate have been derived in [7]. In [9] the secure rate is
evaluated and the main results are reported also in [10].
In particular we have that the mutual information between
Alice and Bob is lower bounded by [9]
IAB  log2
(
VA + 1 + χt
1 + χt
)
(21)
with
χt = χl + +VAχθ (22)
where the variance of the “line” noise is
χl = 1 − Gη
Gη
+  + νel
Gη
, (23)
where χθ is given by (19).
On the other hand, Eve’s information IBE in this case
is the Holevo accessible information and is obtained by
the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrices. As
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FIG. 3. Secure key rate R against individual attacks as a function of the distance for three values of BT and symbols Ns = 1 or Ns = 5
(VA = 1).
presented in [9,10], it is given by
IBE =
2∑
i=1
[
λi + 1
2
log2
(
λi + 1
2
)
− λi − 1
2
log2
(
λi − 1
2
)]
− λ3 + 1
2
log2
(
λ3 + 1
2
)
+ λ3 − 1
2
log2
(
λ3 − 1
2
)
.
(24)
The terms λi are given by [9]
λ1,2 =
√
1
2
(A ±
√
A2 − 4B), (25)
λ3 =
√
(VA + 1) (VA + 1)χl + 1 + ((VA + 1)
2 − 1)χθ
VA − 1 + χl (26)
with
A = (VA + 1)2(1 − 2Gη) + (Gη)2(VA + 1 + χl)2
+ 2Gη[(VA + 1)2 − 1]χθ ), (27)
B = Gη[(VA + 1)χl + 1 + ((VA + 1)2 − 1)χθ ]. (28)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. With individual attacks
The effects of phase noise are first considered in terms
of net secure rate as a function of the distance, for a fiber
with specific attenuation 0.2 dB/km and system parameters
in a typical range of a realistic scenario, used also in [4,8,10],
namely, the efficiency of the reconciliation procedure β = 0.8,
photodetector efficiency η = 0.5, electronic noise νel = 0.01,
and excess noise  = 0.09. The estimation error on φ1 and φ2
is neglected. The secure rate is shown in Fig. 3 for different
values of the phase-noise bandwidth BT and two values of the
symbol length, namely Ns = 1 and Ns = 5. The modulation
variance is VA = 1. We can see that the reduction of the
secure rate is limited for values of the phase-noise-normalized
bandwidth up to BT = 0.05. Note that for a sufficiently high
symbol rate 1/T , commercial lasers can achieve a bandwidth
with BT ≈ 0.01. Thus the degradation introduced by the phase
noise is acceptable also for Ns = 5, the value for which the
spectral efficiency can increase from 50% as in [10] to about
83%. We should note that the modulation variance VA can
be optimized, within the power limitation of the transmitter.
Then, to show the actual degradation introduced by the phase
noise, one can take as reference the distance at which a
certain secure key rate R is obtained in the absence of phase
noise, for example, the value R = 10−3. Then the degradation
introduced by the phase noise is accounted for by the relative
reduction in the distance to achieve the same rate R, for the
best value of VA. Namely, if d0 is the distance at which
the secure rate R is obtained with no phase noise and d
in the presence of phase noise, the distance penalty PD is
given by
PD = min
VA
(
d0 − d
d0
)
. (29)
This penalty is shown in Fig. 4 together with the corresponding
optimum value of the modulation variance Vopt for the same
parameter values as in the previous figure and three values
of the data symbol length Ns . A value of penalty of 100%
means that the degradation introduced by the phase noise is
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FIG. 4. Distance penalty and optimum modulation variance Vopt as a function of the normalized phase noise bandwidth BT (β = 0.8,
η = 0.5, νel = 0.01,  = 0.09).
so high that the reference secure rate cannot be reached at
any distance. The curves of PD show that the impossibility
of achieving the secure rate of 10−3, thus a distance penalty
equal to 100%, is obtained for values of BT which are quite
reasonable, of the order of 0.1. For example, a system with a
symbol rate of 100 MHz would require a laser with linewidth
of 10 MHz. However, the penalty introduced by phase noise
cannot be neglected in general, especially if a higher spectral
efficiency is sought, for example, with Ns = 5. In other words,
the penalty due to phase noise is noticeable, but a proper
choice of the symbol rate and laser linewidth permits the
exchange of a secure key with a good spectral efficiency. As
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FIG. 5. Secure key rate R against collective attacks as a function of the distance for three values of BT and useful symbols Ns = 1 or
Ns = 5 (VA = 100).
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FIG. 6. Distance penalty as a function of the normalized phase noise bandwidth BT (β = 0.8, η = 0.5, νel = 0.01,  = 0.09, VA = 100).
the optimal modulation variance VA is concerned, it can be
noted that Vopt is not far from unity in general. After a first
decrease with increasing phase noise, a minimum is obtained,
then as the phase noise increases again a higher modulation
variance is needed. However, for the corresponding values
of the phase noise, the system becomes almost useless
since the distance to achieve the secure rate becomes too
small.
B. With collective attacks
In the case of collective attacks, the secure rate is lower
and shows a behavior with a drop, corresponding to a limit
distance, as shown in Fig. 5, for a fiber with specific attenuation
0.2 dB/km. As in the previous results, the other parameters are
as follows: reconciliation efficiency β = 0.8, photodetector
efficiency η = 0.5, electronic noise νel = 0.01, and excess
noise  = 0.09. Note, however, that to get similar values of
distance and rate a greater value of the modulation variance,
namely VA = 100, is considered in this results. Also with
collective attacks, the penalty introduced by the phase noise
can be accounted for by the reduction in the distance to achieve
the same secure rate as in the absence of phase noise, namely
PD . In Fig. 6 the distance penalty is presented as a function of
the laser phase-noise bandwidth BT . Note that in this case the
rate increases with the modulation variance so that optimum
is always the maximum value for VA, which in this case is
VA = 100. The same system parameters as in Fig. 5 are used.
In this case the penalty is lower, but we should note that the
reference key rate is taken close to the limit value, where it
drops to zero. Note that the value of the modulation variance
is much larger than in the previous case where the security
against individual attacks is considered.
VI. CONCLUSION
The effect of phase noise has been considered in CV-QKD,
showing that high symbol-rate systems can sustain a limited
degradation due to phase noise, even with off the shelf compo-
nents as lasers, if a pilot-assisted estimation and compensation
method is employed. However, if security against collective
attacks must be guaranteed, then the system requirements in
terms of modulation variance are more compelling and the
protocol exhibits a limit distance, i.e., a maximum channel
attenuation, where the secure key rate rate drops to zero. A
tradeoff between spectral efficiency and phase-noise penalty
occurs, in terms of the number of data symbols between two
pilots.
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